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ABSTRACT
Study of diffusion or propagation of information over a network of connected entities play
a vital role in understanding and analyzing the impact of such diffusion, in particular, in the
context of epidemiology, and social and market sciences. Typical concerns addressed by these
studies are to control the diffusion such that influence is maximally (in case of opinion propaga-
tion) or minimally (in case of infectious disease) felt across the network. Controlling diffusion
requires deployment of resources and often availability of resources are socio-economically con-
strained. In this context, we propose an agent-based framework for resource allocation, where
agents operate in a cooperative environment and each agent is responsible for identifying and
validating control strategies in a network under its control. The framework considers the pres-
ence of a central controller that is responsible for negotiating with the agents and allocate
resources among the agents. Such assumptions replicates real-world scenarios, particularly in
controlling infection spread, where the resources are distributed by a central agency (federal
govt.) and the deployment of resources are managed by a local agency (state govt.).
If there exists an allocation that meets the requirements of all the agents, our framework
is guaranteed to find one such allocation. While such allocation can be obtained in a blind
search methods (such as checking the minimum number of resources required by each agent or
by checking allocations between each pairs), we show that considering the responses from each
agent and considering allocation among all the agents results in a negotiation based technique
that converges to a solution faster than the brute force methods. We evaluated our framework
using data publicly available from Stanford Network Analysis Project to simulate different
types of networks for each agents.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The study of propagation of information in a network of connected entities is an important
area of research in multiple application domains ranging from epidemiology, social and market
sciences to intrusion detection in computer science. The entities in the network can describe
groups of hosts, populations, individuals or computer systems, while the corresponding infor-
mation can be infectious diseases, opinions, fire or computer worms. The network itself describe
how one entity can influence or can be influenced by others. It is important to understand and
analyze the propagation of information to either contain the spread of information within de-
sired level (e.g., in epidemiology) or maximize its impact (e.g., in marketing strategies). Most
of the existing work is focused on the mathematical modeling of the behavior of the entities
in the network and on analyzing the rate at which the external influences (e.g., immunizing
the nodes, seeding with information) should be deployed to realize the desired results in the
presence of information propagation.
Network is typically viewed as graph containing nodes and edges. Nodes represent entities
in the network and edges represent some relationship between the nodes (Proximity, Friendship,
Heredity, etc.). The basic step in understanding the impact of a spread of diseases, opinions,
influences or computer viruses in a network involves understanding the behavior of population
constituting the network. That is, one needs to analyze how the network expands and contracts
if and when individuals or population groups join or leave the network. Such a study of networks
led to development of random networks (Erdos and Renyi (1960)), small-world networks (Watts
and Strogatz (1998); Barabasi and Albert (1999)), scale-free networks and their variants. The
behavior of the networks is described in terms of the states, states being ’S’ - the susceptible
state of the entity, ’E’ - exposed state of the entity, ’I’- the Infected state of entity and ’R’ - the
state of entity those recovered due to immunization or entity removed from the network due
2to death which is referred as SEIR model (Anderson and May (1979)). Other Variants being
SI, SIR, SIS (Hsu and Hsieh (2005)). Another important aspect necessary for understanding
how much of the network will be impacted due to information spread is the analysis of nature
of spread. There are several models such as Independent Cascade model, Linear Threshold
model etc., that capture information diffusion in the network (Shakarian et al. (2015)). In
opinion propagation, the nature of spread can be analyzed by saying that an individual will
be influenced by the opinion if majority of his/her friends hold the same opinion (Lerman
and Ghosh (2010)) while in computer worm propagation, a host is affected by a worm if the
worm moves from another host deemed to be ”known” by the former host Gebhart (2004).
We will use the terms infection and information interchangeably. We will also use spread and
propagation interchangeably.
In epidemiology, the network of entities corresponds to population groups and their spa-
tial/proximity relationships. Epidemiologists study the spread of the infectious diseases over
such a network and classify them as outbreak, epidemic or pandemic based on severity and
rate of the spread in the network (Eubank et al. (2004)). Existing research is focused on how
the disease would spread in the given network and devise effective strategies to contain the
spread (Do and Lee (2016)). We want to focus on the problem of resource allocation given
a real-world epidemic scenario. Lets consider an example; there was an outbreak of Ebola in
few West African countries Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia etc. Ebola being a deadly disease
which can be out of control if no measures taken, epidemiologists wanted to study the disease
to eradicate it. But the primary question here is, How do we distribute the vaccines among
multiple countries or among multiple cities in the same country when government or private
agencies have limited vaccines? To understand the emphasis on distribution of resources among
multiple regions, consider a scenario where region A have same number of infections as in re-
gion B but A might handle the spread of infection better than B (because of better medical
facilities or due to less density of population). So we focus on the problem of resource allocation
where decision of distributing vaccines is handled by a central controller (government or central
health organization) while agents (different cities or countries) get to choose where to place the
vaccines using their own strategies.
3With technological revolution in present days, information diffuses at very high rate which
comes with its own pros and cons. In social/market sciences, the network captures the exchange
of ideas and information among peers/leaders/followers. In Influence maximization problem
(also referred as opinion propagation), sufficient set of nodes are identified that have maximal
influence on spread of information. The objective is to maximize the spread by seeding in-
formation at the most influential node set, widely used in marketing strategies (Shafiq et al.
(2013)). The contrast of maximization being Influence minimization problem, the spread of
undesirable information or misinformation like rumors etc., is contained/suppressed by iden-
tifying the minimal set of links to be blocked. Especially during some major events such as
elections, it is very critical to stop the spread of rumors as it might change the public opinion
based on misinformation. This type of problem boils down to distribution of available resources
to contain the spread of rumor at different regions.
While these are the examples of people/social networks, a technology networks such as
Internet is a network of computer devices and the network and security experts analyze how
the integrity of multiple networks are impacted by the propagation of worms. It may happen
that when multiple networks are attacked, one of the many networks attacked is connected to
military servers which cannot handle compromise of highly classified information while other
network attacked is connected to internal servers which might handle the attack (consequences
might be minimal) in a better way. The scenario becomes complex when there are less resources
than required to combat the attack. It is important to analyze how the resources e.g. anti-virus
can be distributed strategically when having some knowledge about networks attacked.
There are other types of real world problems like Power Grid, Fire Fighter etc., that can
be modeled in a way similar to above mentioned scenarios. In Firefighter problem, various
regions can be modeled as multiple networks where entities can represent a building and edges
can represent the physical proximity (Finbow and Macgillivray (2007)). Protecting one of
the region might prevent cascading fire to connected regions. When allocating resources, the
objective must be to distribute fire fighters in a way that controls the spread of fire in all
such regions while spread of fire is minimized in totality. Few scenarios that we face in our
day to day activity can be modeled as a resource allocation problem to find a solution. For
4example, let’s consider the problem of congestion in major cities like San Francisco in California
and we might want to prevent the overflow of traffic at certain regions. It is often the case
that patrols available to control such traffic, are limited in number. To find an allocation of
patrols to different regions, the problem can be formulated as follows; every region can act as
an agent where nodes represent the intersections of roads, edges represent the roads connecting
the intersections and actual traffic flow is the information diffusing. Placing a patrol at a node
prevents the node and its immediate neighbors from congestion. We need to find a strategy
to distribute available patrols such that number of regions with congestion is minimal while
leaving the decision of choosing where to place the patrols to the agents.
Given a network or multiple networks with possible infections, every region with infec-
tion can be considered to be controlled by an agent. If subgraphs or regions are connected (i.e.
subgraphs from same network), we assume that agents are responsible for their respective neigh-
borhood without considering the connectedness between the regions. Precisely, we consider the
problem of resource allocation (resources can be vaccines, antivirus, generators, patrols) among
multiple cooperative agents by a mediator negotiating until an optimal agreement is reached.
Agents complete preferences/ requirements are not known to other agents and mediator. Based
on the little information agents provide about their preferences, mediator distributes the re-
sources among multiple agents. Leveraging this type of framework, only subspace of the entire
solution space is visited. But the worst case would be to visit the entire solution space (Saha
and Sen (2007)). Similar framework is being utilized in multiple domains such as, manufac-
turing and scheduling, network bandwidth allocation, space applications, crisis management
etc., where multiple agents negotiate to reach to an agreement on resource allocation (Briola
and Mascardi (2011)). There has been lot of investigation on multi-agent resource allocation
problem and as a result many protocols have been established based on number of factors such
as; the kind of resources (shareable, non-shareable, consumable, indivisible) being allocated,
the type of allocation procedure, the reason behind the resource allocation (international crisis
- social welfare, airline traffic management - avoid collisions, network bandwidth allocation -
avoid congestion). We incorporate the ideology of mediator negotiating for resource allocation
among multiple non-competing agents using our own mechanism for negotiation and simulating
5agents. Given a set of networks(act as agents) which needs resources to control information
diffusion, we want to address whether globally available resources can be distributed such that
every agent is successful in controlling information diffusion.
1.1 Challenges & Objectives
Difficulty in controlling the information diffusion is that control mechanisms are not avail-
able a prior. Existing work primarily focuses on the developing of control strategies for a given
set of resources. The problem of resource allocation is challenging owing to the complexities
and the size of the network. Exploring all possible strategies to distribute resources across
multiple networks can be impractical in real time because of the run time overhead. This
brings in a new challenge of resource allocation. Given a collection of regions controlled by
agents, who are responsible for deciding whether or not a given set of vaccines/control measure
is sufficient to address epidemics of disease/information in their respective network and if the
agents cooperate, our objective is to find whether a central controller can effectively distribute
vaccines to every such region.
1.2 Proposed framework
We propose a framework for utilizing the limited resources to control information diffusion
in different networks. Given a collection of regions controlled by cooperative agents, who are
responsible for deciding whether or not a given set of vaccines/control measure is sufficient to
address epidemics of disease/information in their respective network, mediator is assigned the
responsibility of distributing the available resources among agents and negotiating by itera-
tively considering the responses from the agents if required.
Method : We use an iterative resource allocation method controlled by a central controller
(mediator) to distribute resources among multiple agents overseeing their neighborhoods Kyaw
et al. (2013a). Agent provides little information based on the properties of their respective
neighborhood. This way, controller has some information about the agents engaging in negoti-
ating process. We allow only limited information exchange between the controller and agents
6Figure 1.1: Example of multiple agents (Krebs (2010))
to maintain distributed nature of the control mechanism. Few given neighborhoods might be
dense while others might be sparse. So blindly dividing the available resources equally might
not be a good strategy in every case. In our methodology, controller leverage the information
provided by each agent and based on the protocol, allocates resources. Once the resources are
allocated to all the agents, every agent checks if the objective can be met. If any of the agents
is not satisfied, then mediator tries to negotiate with the agents (here agents are cooperative
rather than competitive) until a solution is found or it can be concluded that there exists no
solution such that all the agents can be satisfied with available resources. For example, con-
sider the Figure 1.1, there are multiple networks controlled by agents which needs resources to
control the information diffusion. The goal of the central controller is to distribute the available
resources such that every agent can successfully meet its requirement to control information
spread.
71.3 Contribution
To summarize, following are the contributions of this work:
1. An agent-based negotiation strategy for effective allocation of vaccines to
agents
The strategy is guaranteed to obtain a solution where each agent is satisfied with the
allocation, if one exists. The strategy is iterative where in each iteration, new approxi-
mations of the solution are computed by taking into consideration responses from agents
in the previous iterations. The strategy is particularly efficient in situations when the
existence of the solution is altered by addition/removal of a small percentage of vaccines.
2. A framework for evaluating and validating the negotiation strategy
The framework can be used with different types of agent responses and can be used to
compare against different iterative strategies for negotiations.
3. Applicability
The strategy is empirically evaluated by conducting experiments on different networks
publilcly available in Stanford Network Analysis Project (Leskovec and Krevl (2014)).
Experimental results reveal the feasibility and applicability of our framework to different
real world networks.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we talk about existing traditional
approaches to control the information diffusion and existing applications of multi-agent con-
troller based framework in different fields. In Section 3, we discuss our framework that helps
us devise a strategy such that all the agents successfully control the information diffusion. We
present the outline of the negotiation process using an illustrative example, and the agent’s
simulation algorithm . In Section 4, we present our experimental results performed on real
world networks and comparison of our results to traditional approach (brute-force). In Section
5, we summarize our contributions, and discuss the possible extensions to this work.
8CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Different aspects of the modeling and the analysis of information propagation over differ-
ent types of networks have been studied. One line of research focuses on understanding the
topological structure of the real world network. Another line of work focuses on understanding
the nature of information propagation over the network. This is achieved by considering a
network that closely represents a real-world distribution of entities and by running extensive
simulations to mimic the spread of certain information (infectious diseases, opinions, rumors,
computer worm, fire, traffic, attackers, etc.). Researchers further consider the problem of al-
tering the spread, either to contain the spread or to maximize the impact of the spread; the
objective is to find the rate at which the nodes in the network should be externally influenced
(e.g., vaccinating nodes, deploying anti-virus, assigning patrol cars, firefighters, inserting or
re-enforcing opinions). While the existing work focused on altering the spread either to max-
imize or minimize the impact of spread, we focus on the problem of allocating resources to
multiple agents representing their respective neighborhoods. The basic assumption is that in-
formation is propagating in multiple localities where each locality is overlooked by an agent
where multiple agents cooperate with each other (negotiate) to share resources and are typically
controlled by a central controller with an objective to mitigate information diffusion. Agents
can deploy different control strategies to mitigate the propagation. In this context, we discuss
the contribution of existing work in controlling propagation and different network topologies
and diffusion models (Section 2.1). Then we present an overview of the work that adapted
multi-agent negotiation framework in various fields (Section 2.2).
92.1 Controlling Information Propagation
A network is a graph containing set of nodes and edges. Nodes represent entities in the
network while edges represent the relationship (the reason behind the connection) between the
nodes. Before deciding on the network topology and diffusion model, several questions such
as; what will form the connections in the network? how much contact between the entities will
lead to an infection spread in the network? are addressed by extensive research and simulations
on real world models (Keeling and Eames (2005)).
To give a small overview about network topology: in random networks, every connection
is formed at random. Each individual has fixed number of neighbors to which infection can
propagate. In Lattice networks, entities are placed on a grid (generally in two dimensions)
and edges are established between adjacent entities. This type of networks are mostly used in
modeling the forest-fire networks. Lattice networks have high clustering and long path lengths
while random networks lack clustering and have short path lengths. Small world networks
are mixture of lattice and random networks, can be viewed as random connections added to
a lattice network. Every node can be reached from most other nodes in the network. This
type of networks are widely used in modeling epidemic networks. Scale-free networks are built
by adding new entities and its connections preferably to entities which have large number
of connections which imitates the social networks in real world. This type of networks are
usually seen in World Wide Web networks, power grid networks, network of actor collaborations
etc. Number of connections in this type of network takes power law distribution. Scale free
networks depict heterogeneity while random networks, lattice networks, small world networks
are homogeneous (Keeling and Eames (2005)).
There are a wide range of work employing techniques such as link removal (Marcelino and
Kaiser (2009) , Tong et al. (2012)), merging infected nodes (Zhang and Prakash (2014)), block-
ing nodes (Briesemeister et al. (2003)), ranking based on eigen value (Tong et al. (2012)),
choosing random nodes to vaccinate (Cohen et al. (2003)) etc., to control information prop-
agation. Challenging factor is the size of the given real-world networks, they are often very
large and finding an optimal solution will be a NP-Hard Problem in all such cases. Few studies
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were specific to networks such as scale-free networks while few are based on arbitrary networks.
Dybiec et al. (2004) affirm that it is not possible to control the spread in scale free networks by
preventive measures unless there are sufficiently many vaccines to treat large population. They
also believe that it’s not always possible to have complete information about how the disease
spreads, sometimes the disease spreads from individual who is infected but undetected. In case
of computer virus outbreak, reducing the connectivity between different internal networks can
always be considered as an approach to prevent the epidemic but Briesemeister et al. (2003)
believe that, it cannot be counted as a defense mechanism; there might be a case that attack
has been realized long after it actually took place. Analysis on the network topology and the
process of information diffusion plays an important role while devising a control strategy. For
instance, Sapphire worms can exist only in Microsoft operating systems, hence eliminating
devices with any other operating system will make the network smaller to handle.
(Zhang and Prakash (2014)) considered the problem of selecting k best nodes to immu-
nize/quarantine in social/computer network when an infection is spreading. The goal is to
find the best way to distribute available vaccines when disease is spreading. They assume that
when nodes are immunized by vaccines, they are removed from the network itself. This type
of questions can be similar to questions in other domains. For instance, in field of rumor prop-
agation, one case ask which accounts in twitter must be disabled to discard a spam message?
in field of computer networks, which computers or servers in the network should first be given
the antivirus (in what order)? The problem is defined formally as Given a graph G(V,E) where
V represents the nodes and E represents the edges between the nodes, initial infected node set
I0, SIR model with propagation probability on each edge{i, j}p(i,j) ∈ P and curing probability δ,
and budget k (integer), find a set S of |k| nodes from V to vaccinate to minimize expected total
number of infected nodes during the spread of disease.
Authors basic assumption is that given budget is not sufficient to vaccinate entire immediate
neighborhood of infected nodes in I0. They proved that the problem defined above is a NP-hard
problem. Generally graphs have submodular structure which leads to near to optimal solution
but function used here is not submodular making it harder to approximate. The idea behind
the proposed solution is that all the infected nodes are merged into a single super infected node.
11
(a) Original Graph (b) Dominator Tree
Figure 2.1: Example of dominator tree for a given graph
Because, in disease or virus or meme spread, what is important is, how are the non-infected
(healthy) nodes are connected to infected nodes rather than how infected nodes are connected
to each other. The merging is done as follows: if a node z has infected neighbors, u with edge
weight (probability) pu and v with edge weight pv, then new edge probability would be a logical
OR of all individual probabilities i.e. 1-(1-pu)(1-pv). If the resultant graph G
′ obtained after
merging is a tree, then optimal solution can be obtained by calculating the benefit (essentially
expected number of nodes to be saved after particular node is removed is referred to as benefit
of that particular node) of every neighbor node of I′ and selecting top k nodes with highest
benefit. If the resultant graph is not a tree, a dominator tree is obtained from the new graph G′.
A node y dominates node x if every path from I0 to x has y. Node y is immediate dominator of
node x if every dominator of x (excluding y) dominates node y. Dominator tree is constructed
by adding edges between nodes x and y if y is a dominator, using I0 as root. Figure 2.1 is an
example of dominator tree where if p = 1, then optimal solution is to vaccinate 4. We can see
that finding optimal solution in dominator tree is quicker when compared to original graph.
While the authors Zhang and Prakash (2014) claim that this approach, is scalable to large
networks (modeled as IC model and SIR model), can be applied to field of epidemics, social sci-
ences (contain rumor spread), computer networks, and is 10 times better than other algorithms,
Tong et al. (2012) makes a point expressing that deleting set of nodes to contain information
diffusion might not be appropriate in all the cases. For instance, in social network, legitimate
Facebook or Twitter accounts cannot be deleted to stop the rumor. Instead edge between
nodes can be removed, meaning people can be unfriended if need arises. Now the problem boils
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down to finding the best k set of edges to be removed such that rumor propagation can be
stopped. Kimura et al. (2008) also followed the theory of edge removal to address the problem
of minimizing the undesirable (computer worm, rumor) information propagation. They also
made a point about node vs edge removal techniques stating that Blocking links between nodes
that have high out degree is not always effective like in case with removal of nodes.
Briesemeister et al. (2003) developed a framework to study the defensibility of computer
network against malicious code/worms propagating by itself. This work has analyzed different
aspects such as; the strategies that worms and viruses employ to spread infection in network
(e.g., CodeRed propagated by identifying targets using random scanning), critical functionality
of network etc., to devise a defense strategy. To simulate the control against attack, node level
blocking of message exchanges between alerted applications was employed. Their insight after
the study was that few scale free networks are inherently defensive. (Cohen et al. (2003)) deals
with similar kind of objective but the immunization strategy is based on chosing small portion
of random entities to be vaccinated. Tong et al. (2012) used eigenvalue to decide on which k
edges must be removed. The smaller the eigenvalue, the better set of k edges to be removed to
contain the spread of rumor or virus propagation in computer networks.
Kimura et al. (2008) modeled the network as an Independent cascade model, hence the
diffusion happens according to edge probabilities. In most of existing works, networks are
modeled as Independent cascade model. To give a quick idea about independent cascade
model (IC model): The diffusion in IC model takes place in discrete time steps. Every state
of the node can either be active or inactive and every edge is given a probability between 0
and 1. Every active node gets one chance to activate the neighbor node and succeeds with
probability p associated between the active node and the neighbor node. If a node at time t+1
have multiple active neighbors at time t, then every node is given a chance in arbitrary order.
This process terminates when there is no new node activated.
Kimura et al. (2008) formulated the problem formally as minimization problem: Given an
integer k, find a subset D′ such that |D′|=k and c(G(D′)) ≤ c(G(D)) for any D ⊂ E with D=|k|.
G(D) is the graph obtained by removing the set of edges in D, c(G) is called contamination
degree (average of influence degrees of all nodes in G).
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c(G) = 1|V |
∑
v∈V σ(v,G)
where σ(v,G) is expected number of activated nodes towards the end on IC model of G, also
called influence degree of node v. Now finding the set of k edges to minimize c(G(D)) will
lead to combinatorial explosion, hence approximation is used. The authors used an estimation
method which is similar to bond percolation method to find the k best set of edges to be
removed in the graph G.
Dybiec et al. (2004) conducted experiments on different topologies like small-world networks,
scale-free networks, one-dimensional lattice etc., while Briesemeister et al. (2003) observed
experiments on scale free networks and considered the network to be a SI model. Cohen et al.
(2003) also demonstrated that strategy works well with scale-free networks such as movie-actors
network, computer networks (email, World Wide Web, Internet) which have broad distribution
of connections over the network.
Marcelino and Kaiser (2009) is a case study emphasizing on edge removal approach is better
than blocking the nodes approach. Experiment was conducted on airline networks and results
were as follows: selected airline cancellation is better than shutting down airport in totality,
former took 81% longer to spread where there was 50% reduction in the latter case. Chen
et al. (2010) expressed that while there are many strategies involving modeling the optimization
problem as a game, few real world aspects are being missed such as node autonomy: on one hand
finding socially optimal strategies is challenging, on other hand socially optimal strategy may
not reflect individual entities decision of whether to get vaccinated/quarantined. Hence authors
believe that such factors must be given weight and proposed an polynomial approximation
algorithm of O(log n) which minimizes the total estimated cost (cost is associated with both
entity being vaccinated and entity being infected).
There has been large epidemics in last decade, to name a few, rhizomania, citrus canker
etc. Traditionally success of the control strategy is measure in terms of number of individuals
affected by the disease or by number of individuals saved regardless of the cost. This would
be prefect if the vaccination is cheap. But often in real-world scenarios, we should be able to
control the spread of epidemic at moderate cost using limited available resources. Dybiec et al.
(2004) aims to stop the spread of disease on networks at moderate cost using limited resources
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Figure 2.2: Example of Dybiec et al. (2004) Strategy
and local control strategies. By local strategies they mean that neighborhood centered around
infectious node is considered while applying local methods to stop the disease spread. The
basic assumption is that only limited knowledge of network is known which is only about the
local links. For instance, consider the Figure 2.2, which represents a two-dimensional regular
lattice networks where the infected node is in contact with four first order neighbors (immediate
neighbors is referred as first order neighbors, neighbors of first order is referred as second order
neighbors and so forth), eight second order neighbors and one shortcut edge. The disease
spreads locally within first order neighbors and shortcuts, therefore individuals located within
a fixed order z can be treated by control actions. But here the control strategy is efficient only
when there is small neighborhood. Sometimes the disease spreads at faster rate and considering
only the local neighborhood to control the spread might not work. Also this type of strategy is
topology dependent. Another drawback is that efficiency of controlling the spread is dependent
on choice of the radius (z).
Habiba et al. (2010) consider the problem of hindering the spread of rumors, misinformation,
virus etc., in social or epidemic networks. This work focuses on dynamic nature of the network.
For instance, questions like who has the information at current moment and which individuals
are likely to get information in the next moment should be addressed. The strategy to eliminate
the spread is based on number of graph properties (allocating weight to evolution of network
at every time step). Few of such properties are listed below.
1. Degree of a node: number of neighbors of a node
2. Density: percentage of edges in the network
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3. Dynamic Density: average density of network at each time step
4. Diameter: maximum length of the all the shortest paths
5. Temporal path: is a sequence of nodes v1,v2 . . . vn where (vi,vi+1) ∈ Et for some t. Also
for any i, j such that i+1 < j, and vi ∈ Vt and vj ∈ Vx then t < x. The length of the
temporal path is equal to number of time steps
6. Betweeness: of a node is equal to sum of fractions of all the shortest path between this
node and every other node in the network. This property depicts the position of particular
node in the network
7. Dynamic Betweeness: of a node is fraction of all shortest temporal paths passing through
this node. This property depicts the idea of capturing which individual has the informa-
tion at current moment and which individual will receive it next
8. clustering coefficient: of an individual is the fraction of neighbors who are neighbors
among themselves
9. Dynamic clustering coefficient: captures which entities are interacting among themselves
in previous step.
While these are some measures listed, authors used 17 such measures to rank different nodes and
selected top ranked nodes to vaccinate until the spread reduced to less than 10%. Experiments
were explored on networks such as email communication of Enron cooperation, co-citations
among scientists, co-location of individuals in a population, population of Grevy’s Zebras etc.
2.2 Multi-Agent Resource Allocation
Negotiation is appropriate whenever we encounter a situation with conflict among multiple
parties over any resource. Negotiation can be different types; competitive bargaining is where
multiple parties tend to be self-interested and the process is viewed as a competition (its win or
lose), positional bargaining is where parties tend to fix on a position and negotiate to reach an
agreement essentially by compromising. Integrative bargaining is where agents try to cooperate
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and reach a win-win agreement such that all the parties are satisfied (Kyaw et al. (2013b)).
multi-agent negotiation with shareable resources based framework is adopted in various fields
ranging from international crisis management, grid computing, manufacturing and scheduling,
network bandwidth allocation to space applications. Basic setting of the framework is as follows:
There are multiple agents willing to cooperate either to mutually benefit each other or for cause
of social welfare. Multiple agents are allocated resources based on negotiation protocol (can be
in one or multiple steps) to reach a mutually optimal agreement. Agents can be competitive or
cooperative and might have complete information or partial information about other agents.
Resources can be consumable or non-consumable.
Chevaleyre et al. (2006) analyzed various aspects relating to multi-agent resource alloca-
tion environment to determine a protocol to adapt, such as, what is the purpose of resource
allocation (social welfare, collision avoidance etc.)? What type of procedure is used to decide
on allocation of resources? What type of resources are being distributed among agents (con-
sumable or non-consumable, shared or cannot be shared, indivisible or divisible). Typically,
the allocation procedure can be interpreted as centralized or distributed. In both the cases a
single system is responsible for deciding on allocation of resources. The process of multi-agent
negotiation can be viewed as an auctioneer trying to finalize the bids from different contractors.
Authors defined the term multi-agent in distributed environment as computational burden of
finding an allocation is a responsibility shared among multiple agents. If the goal(final out-
come) is driven according to assessment of individual preferences, the allocation is computed
depending on preferences of several agents (rather than individual preference). The objectives
of such framework is either to find a feasible or optimal allocation of resources or both. For
instance, goal can be either to find a feasible allocation of tasks to production units such that
tasks are completed within the deadline or to find an optimal solution such that utility of every
agent is as high as possible, or to find an optimal solution from set of feasible solutions (less
distance, less conflicts) to avoid aircraft collisions.
The type of environment in multi-agent resource allocation framework can be divided into
two categories. In one environment, agents do not have any or has some knowledge about
other agents participating in the negotiation whereas in the second type of environment, agents
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have complete knowledge about other agents participating in the negotiation. It is easier to
negotiate in the latter case as agents have complete knowledge, coming up with mutually
beneficial agreements is undemanding. In Competitive (also referred as self-interested agents)
environment, typically agents have complete knowledge about other agents, therefore studies
focus on game theoretical modeling of the environment. In our framework, we assume the
agents to be cooperative, hence we focus on protocols to allocate indivisible resources among
multiple agents where agents do not complete knowledge about each other. There are few basic
protocols such as:
1. Strict Alteration: In this protocol, every agent participating gets to pick one resource
in every turn and agents is allowed to choose alternatively (Brams and Taylor (2000)).
2. Balanced alteration: In this protocol, the basic assumption is that the agents who gets
to choose first have advantage over the other agent. So the second agent gets to choose
in both second and third turns and so on. For instance, agent1 gets turns 1,4,5,8 . . .
and agent2 gets turns 2,3,6,7 . . . to pick a resource. This protocol is devised to improve
fairness (Brams and Taylor (2000)+.
3. Contract-Net protocol: In this protocol, one of the agents takes the role of manager
and other agents act as contractors. For every task, manager advertises about the task
and let agents bid for the task. Agents evaluate the task, to see if the task can be fulfilled
with resources (time, hardware etc.,) and makes an offer accordingly. Depending on the
bids, manager selects the most appropriate bid and assigns the task to agent who won.
Manager monitors and reassigns the task if progress is not satisfactory (Davis and Smith
(1988)).
4. Exchange auctions: This protocol is extension of Contract-Net protocol. In this pro-
tocol, the initial resource allocation is assumed to be given. Then agents come up with
resources they are ready to exchange and other agents bid resources for exchange. The
goal of this protocol is to reach a better allocation of resources (Saha and Sen (2007)).
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In most of the works of multi-agent systems, average welfare of agents representing the
society is taken as welfare of egalitarian society. Endriss et al. (2011) considers the multi-
agent system as society of software agents with an objective to increase overall social welfare of
such society. Initial assumption is that agents holds set of indivisible resources from total set
of resources to which utility is assigned by each agent. This study emphasizes on egalitarian
social welfare which brings the intuition of fairness (welfare is associated with welfare of weakest
member of the society). Whereas the protocol in Kyaw et al. (2013b) is based on utilities
(preferences) of individual agents. As Chevaleyre et al. (2006) discussed about the one of the
factors that plays a vital role in deciding negotiation protocol is to analyze the purpose of
resource allocation. Based on the requirements, protocols can be further classified. Approach
proposed by Kyaw et al. (2013b) was simulated on well-known international conflict called
Camp David that happened between Egypt and Israel and lasted for 13 days. United States
acted as a mediator and initiated the negotiation process. Final agreement was reached after
6 rounds of negotiation on four different issues.
Saha and Sen (2007) proposed a three phase protocol to identify efficient allocation of
resources. A bilateral environment is accustomed, meaning two agents would negotiate over
resources (can also be extended to multilateral environment). To execute the first phase,
they borrowed ’strict alteration’ protocol fromBrams and Taylor (2000) and the outcome of
the first phase would be the initial allocation of resources to agents. If no mutually optimal
allocation can be reached (if no improvement mutually), then initial allocation would be the
final allocation. Second phase involves generating a negotiation tree by agents participating.
In this case, there are two agents, therefore the tree constructed is a binary tree. Maximum
depth of the tree will be equivalent to number of resources in the negotiation process. Root
node is denoted by zero, agent1 can create right child node and agent2 can create left child
node. If no node can be created, then the process is terminated and initial allocation will be
the final allocation. At any level, if one of the agents has utility less than its initial allocation
utility, then further branches are not explored and the node is blacked out. Left child at level l
will represent that resource l will be allocated to agent1 and similarly right child will indicate
that resource will be allocated to agent2. When the tree is constructed, paths from root to
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Figure 2.3: Scenario of agent’s utility values for different allocation from Endriss et al. (2011)
each child node represent the allocation of a set of resources which would be the input to third
phase. In third phase, an arbitrary agent, say agent1, will pick an allocation from the set
obtained from second phase. Other agent removes all allocations such that utility of agent2 is
less than that of utility of allocation proposed by agent1. Now agent2 proposes an allocation
from the set and process is repeated until there is only one allocation in the set which would be
the final allocation or no changes can be made to the set further. If there are many allocations
after third phase, then one of the allocation is chosen randomly.
Authors conclude that the final outcome will be optimal allocation (there will be no outcome
such that one of the agent’s utility is greater than the one in final outcome). Few cons of this
approach is that it takes longer time when resources are more than 100. Authors say that a
solution is generated quickly when there are around 20 resources which is the case in most
real-world scenarios.
This approach proposed by (Endriss et al. (2011)) is scalable to distributed environment.
Allocation A is nothing but distribution of resources to set of agents. The utilitarian social
welfare is defined as the sum of all utilities of agents in the process.
Swu(A) =
∑
i∈A ui(A)
Egalitarian utility function is defined as follows:
Swe(A) = min{ ui | i ∈ A}
Allocations here are considered to be an ordered vector referred to as maxmin-ordering and
allocation A′ is preferred over A if Swe(A) < Swe(A′). To create an ordering, concept of
leximin-ordering is used. Let’s consider an example in Figure 2.3. There are two resources to
be distributed among three agents. Definitely there are allocations better than not allocating
any of the resources to any of the agents. Allocating both the resources to agent2 has utility
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value 17. But the objective is to increase egalitarian social welfare, therefore this allocation
would be ruled out. For instance, (0,0,17) < (0,2,5) where, in the latter allocation agent1 gets
r1 and agent2 gets r2. (0,2,5) will not be the optimal allocation because assigning r2 to agent1
and r1 to agent2 will generate an ordered vector (0,3,4) which is better in terms of swe value
and is the final allocation.
In Kyaw et al. (2013b), the negotiation process is monitored by a mediator agreed upon by
all the players. Mediator holds only partial information about all the players. Players present
their preferences in form of CP-nets (directed graph annotated with qualitative conditional
preference statements) to the mediator. Mediator then generates induced preference graphs
(ordering of different allocation in form of a directed graph) for every player. Players have
their own UCP-nets (utility values for CP-net). Mediator proposes a jointly optimal allocation
depending on every player’s UCP-net, players accept or reject it based on the values in their
UCP-nets. Once the players provide their maximum preferred string, mediator tries to search
for acceptable string for every player based on induced preference graphs. The negotiation
process continues until a certain level in induced preference graphs is reached, which is when
mediator declare that there is no possible jointly optimal solution.
We have seen above the examples of multi-agent resource allocation framework utilization
in International Crisis Management and Egalitarian Social Welfare. Now we shall describe the
framework’s application in field of industrial engineering and collision avoidance. One of the
domain where multi-agent negotiation is widely used is collision avoidance. One such example
is unmanned aircraft routing protocols. To avoid collisions and find alternate routes, to know
how much distance must be maintained, aircrafts need some kind of third party protocol which
negotiates with every other aircraft in the system to reach an outcome. Sˇiˇsla´k et al. (2008)
proposed an algorithm to handle airplane collisions (whenever there is a conflict). In this
algorithm, assumption is that every agent (aircraft) can interact with those agents which are
in certain range. In the case of conflict, all alternative routes are listed. If at all agents fail to
find alternative routes, few parameters will be changed such as altitude, moving to left/right,
speed, until an alternative route is found.
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When current conflict is resolved, a check with other aircrafts is made to see if there are
any other conflicts in the system. If yes then protocol is repeated for the first conflict in the
list (first to occur w.r.t. time) of conflicts.
A similar problem was considered by Agogino and Tumer (2008), they adapted multi-agent
negotiation system to solve the conflicts in airplane routing. In this work, they assume that
entire airspace is divided into regions and further into sectors. Agents in this context are the
ground location of the divided regions where agents own their respective sectors (responsible for
the planes going through that sector). Every airplane has a flight plan which is essentially the
a sequence of ground locations. Agent can change the flight plan in case of conflicts either by
increasing the parameter holding the minimum distance maintained between different planes
or by increasing the time on the ground (airports) or by changing the plane’s path. Every
agent in the conflict propose a set of solutions for the list of conflicts, best one is chosen using
a learning algorithm.
Another application is in the domain of industrial applications where robots operate to
complete assigned tasks avoiding collisions. Every agent is assumed to hold certain reserved
area (can be negotiated) which is assigned using a protocol. Whenever a conflict occurs i.e.
two agent’s (robots) path to reach the destination collides, they communicate with each other
and decide on who should change their paths based on the priorities. Change in path might
involve changing the allocated reserved area or one of the agents might stop until other agent
passes the reserved area. To avoid the possibility of indefinite delay, alternatives are detailed
in Purwin et al. (2008).
To summarize about multi-agent resource allocation; Agents can be either cooperative or
competitive. We have focused on existing work that have considered cooperative agents nego-
tiating over resources. Agents can be in any form depending on the type of the problem. In
Agogino and Tumer (2008), we can consider different airplanes as agents and resource being the
flight plan which is a shareable and non-consumable resource. Agents negotiate over the flight
plan if there exists a conflict. Mediator is the ground area where the conflict occurs and carries
out and controls the negotiation. Similarly in Purwin et al. (2008), agents are nothing but set
of robots and resources being the reserved area which is also shareable and non-consumable
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and also divisible. In this work, there is no external mediator, instead agents communicate
with each other to negotiate. Work of Endriss et al. (2011) considers agents with utility values.
The set of rules deciding which allocation is better can be seen as the negotiation protocol
executed by the mediator. Agents do not know other agent’s utility values i.e. agents do not
know about other agents in the system.
In our work, we have accustomed similar framework where, objective is to control informa-
tion diffusion in multiple regions, resources are the vaccines (can be any of antivrus, firefighter
etc.,) that is to be distributed among multiple agents, overseeing their respective neighborhoods.
A mediator controls the negotiation process and allocates resources based on information pro-
vided by agents (can be considered as utility values). Agents do not have any information
about other agents. We present our work in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
BASED ON NEGOTIATION
In this chapter, we describe our framework to distribute resources among multiple co-
operative agents to control information diffusion. We utilize the concept of multiple agents
negotiating over share-able resources to align with our objective to control information diffu-
sion. We focus on the iterative negotiation protocol, executed by a central controller (referred
to as mediator) to allocate resources. we assume that the network of entities modeled as a
directed graph is given along with the nature of the spread through the entities. We also as-
sume that agents are cooperative rather than competitive. Mediator has access to only partial
information about agents. We aim to allocate resources using our framework leveraging the
partial information provided by agents such that all the agents are satisfied. By end of the
negotiation phase, if any one or more agents are not satisfied with given resources, we use the
output of negotiation protocol as starting point for brute force method to find a strategy to
allocate resources. We start by explaining high level architecture of our framework.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a block diagram of our framework. The input to our framework is
multiple agents which essentially are graphs Graph 1, Graph 2, . . . Graph n that has infec-
tion spreading and requires resources to mitigate information diffusion. Mediator consists of
Competition module and Resource Allocation module. Once the resources are allocated to
agents by the resource allocation module, agents simulate, and accordingly provide results and
input to mediator if necessary. In this thesis, we have considered that agents simulate with
an objective to control the spread within a threshold value equal to one forth of the size of
its neighborhood i.e. with the given vaccines, number of infected nodes should not reach the
given threshold value. Instead of mediator trying to distribute the given resources and find
whether every agent can be satisfied, just providing the minimum number of resources needed
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Figure 3.1: High Level Architecture
by every agent to the mediator will lead us to the optimal number of resources required but for
every agent, to find the minimum number of resources requires many simulations and causes
run-time overhead.
1. Competition Module: In this phase, agents provide partial information about their
neighborhood, based on which, competition is held for various categories. Mediator keeps
track of wins, losses and draws of every single agent. Typically, these wins, losses and
draws depict the critical nature of the agents.
2. Resource Allocation Module: In this phase, allocation of resources is determined by
the mediator based on result of competitions and the negotiation protocol.
3. Agent Simulation Module: Once resources are allocated in the previous phase, agents
simulate to check whether the allocation will suffice their respective needs. For instance, if
one of the agents Ai has 100 nodes in the neighborhood, and is allocated with x vaccines,
agent place the given vaccines using a randomized algorithm with an objective to control
the diffusion with a threshold equal to half of size of its neighborhood that is 50.
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Figure 3.2: Flow of the proposed framework. Here W1, W2, . . . Wn holds the number of
competitions every agent won, and A1, A2, . . . An, are the agents with resources allocated and
R1, R2, . . . Rn represents the results returned by respective agents
High Level Flow of the Proposed Framework:
• Agents provide information to the mediator based on which mediator will initially allocates
resources
• Agents run their simulations with given resources and provide the result to mediator
• Mediator executes the negotiation protocol to reassign the resources among agents and step
2 is repeated.
If every agent is successful (we make use of terminology success or failure to convey whether
agent is satisfied or not satisfied respectively) then that particular distribution of resources is
our desired output. Else agents provide information based on their most recent simulations to
the mediator and the negotiation protocol is repeated by mediator using the new information
provided (Figure 3.2 ). In few cases, this entire process might repeat forever until interrupted.
We shall provide steps to determine oscillation and thus prevent it.
3.1 Mediator
In the framework, agents provide information that characterize the properties of their re-
spective neighborhoods using these below three factors.
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1. Degree of Danger (DD): This factor depicts the danger degree in case the infection
spreads above the threshold. For instance, in computer worm propagation problem, let
one of the agents represent the network connected to confidential servers while the other
agent represents the network connected to public servers. In this case, DD helps depict
the critical nature of agents where DD will be higher for former network and relatively
less for the latter.
2. Degree of Influence (DI): This factor provides the maximum influence an entity has
in the entire neighborhood. For example, in fire fighter’s problem, if one of the agent
have DI as 1000 and another agent have DI as 10. We might want to give preference to
that entity which have 1000 nodes if there are insufficient fire fighters to distribute.
3. Number of Critical Nodes (CN): This gives us the number of critical nodes in the
agent neighborhood. There can be various definitions of the term critical node. We have
considered that the median of all the DI of agents and measured the number of critical
nodes by comparing it to the median. This factor helps the mediator know little about
the structure of the agents in the negotiation process.
Note that, in our framework, agents do not have access to information about other agents. Me-
diator have access to whatever little information an agent provides. For example, in computer
worm propagation problem, one of the agent is the network connected to confidential servers.
But agent might want to keep this information in private, instead informs mediator that it is
critical to protect its neighborhood through Degree of Danger factor. When agent calculates
the number of critical nodes, mediator provides the agents with value of median as mediator
has information about degree of influence of every agent. In this way agents only know that
there is some kind of bound set for measuring critical nodes but do not know individual agent’s
degree of influence information.
3.1.1 Competitions
For each of aspect provided by the agent, a competition will be held between every pair of
agents by the mediator. Mediator keeps track of number of wins and draws for every agent. To
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Table 3.1: Agent Information at Round 1
Agents DD DI CN
A1 200 90 2
A2 400 100 5
A3 350 150 5
A4 120 60 0
A5 300 90 3
better understand our methodology, let’s consider an example. Suppose there are five agents
A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and Table 3.1 holds the initial DD, DI and CN information of respective
agents.
CN is calculated as follows; Median of 60, 90, 90, 100, 150 is 90, Hence CN is the number
of nodes whose degree (number of connections) is greater than 90. For every individual aspect,
number of competitions held is 5C2 = 10 which basically is the number of unique pairs possible
for five agents i.e. competition will be held between (A1, A2) (A1, A3) (A1, A4) (A1, A5) (A2,
A3) (A2, A4) (A2, A5) (A3, A4) (A3, A5) (A4, A5). There are three factors in total, therefore
total number of competitions is 30. A2 has greater DD than A1, A3, A4, and A5, greater DI
than A1, A3, and A5, greater CN than A1, A4, and A5. Therefore, number of wins for A2 is
10. Similarly, number of wins for every agent is calculated:
A1: 3 A2: 10 A3: 10 A4: 0 A5: 5
Observe that competition (A1, A5) is a draw for aspect DI and (A2, A3) is a draw for aspect
CN.
Number of draws = 2
3.1.2 Resource Allocation by Negotiation
We now describe our negotiation protocol for allocating resources. To start with the initial
allocation, few vaccines will be distributed equally (say x) and remaining vaccines (say y) will
be distributed according to the results of competition.
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Result vector of agents, that stores the agent’s results is maintained by mediator and is
initiated to [failure failure failure failure failure].
Number of vaccines to distribute equally = total vaccines × factor
Initially factor is set to 12 . Let the total number of vaccines be 300. In this example, half of
total vaccines, which is equal to 150, will be distributed equally among all the agents and the
remaining 150 vaccines will be allocated according to the results of the competition.
Round 1:
Step1: According to the results of the competition, an agent Ai will get:
Ai =
number of wins of Ai
total competitions × y vaccines
Hence allocation is as follows after step 1:
A1 will be allocated
3
30 × 150 = 15 vaccines
A2 will be allocated
10
30 × 150 = 50 vaccines
A3 will be allocated
10
30 × 150 = 50 vaccines
A4 will be allocated
0
30 × 150 = 0 vaccines
A5 will be allocated
5
30 × 150 = 25 vaccines
Step2: There are 2 draws out of 30 competitions, this portion of vaccines will be added to
number of vaccines to be equally distributed.
Number of vaccines to be equally distributed = x + number of drawstotal competitions × y vaccines
Number of vaccines to be equally distributed= 150 + 230 × 150 = 150 + 10 = 160
There are five agents, as a result every agent will be allocated with 1605 = 32 vaccines along
with the allocation in previous step. Resource allocation after round 1 is given in Table 3.2.
Now, agents will simulate with given resources and provides the results which can be one of
success or failure, to the mediator. Previous Result vector can change in one of the following
possibilities:
1. Count of success in the result vector can increase
2. Count of success in the result vector can decrease
3. Count of success in the result vector can remain the same
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Table 3.2: Resource Allocation after Round 1
Agents Step 1 Step 2 Allocation
A1 15 32 47
A2 50 32 82
A3 50 32 82
A4 0 32 32
A5 25 32 57
Depending on one of the three outcomes, mediator will negotiate according to negotiation
algorithm:
1. If count of success decreases or remains the same then factor = factor2
2. for agent’s who returned success, consider their wins as draws in the next round
Round 2:
In our example, let’s say the result vector after round 1 is [success failure success success
failure] i.e. with the allocation in first round, A2 and A5 were not satisfied (failed to control
infection spread) and A1, A3, A4 were satisfied. Count of success in result vector have increased
and therefore, wins of agents A1, A3, A4 will be considered as draws in the next round of
competitions. Agents will again send their DI and CN (Table 3.3), calculated based on the
nodes visited during the simulation phase, to the mediator. DD of agents will remain the same
throughout the process. For example, let’s say agent A3 has vaccinated nodes n6, n9, n46, n68,
in round 1. A3 will set DI value as the highest number of connections a node has, in the set
{n6, n9, n46, n68} holds. Number of wins for agents is:
A1: 6 A2: 11 A3: 3 A4: 1 A5: 8
Step1: Allocation according to competition results
A2 will be allocated
11
30 × 150 = 55 vaccines
A5 will be allocated
8
30 × 150 = 40 vaccines
Number of draws = 1 + A1 wins + A3 wins + A4 wins
Number of draws = 1 + 6 + 3 + 1 = 11
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Table 3.3: Agent Information at Round 2
Agents DD DI CN
A1 200 90 2
A2 400 100 5
A3 350 50 0
A4 120 60 0
A5 300 80 8
Table 3.4: Resource Allocation after Round 2
Agents Step 1 Step 2 Allocation
A1 0 41 41
A2 55 41 96
A3 0 41 41
A4 0 41 41
A5 40 41 81
Step2: Number of vaccines to equally distribute = 150 + 1130 × 150 = 150 + 55 = 205
Resource allocation after round 2 is given in Table 3.4.
Round 3:
Let’s say the result vector after round 2 is [failure failure success success success]. Count of
success in result vector is the same, therefore, factor is reduced by 1/2 and wins of agents A3,
A4, A5 will be considered as draws in the next round of competitions. Agents will provide their
DI and CN once again (Table 3.5).
Number of vaccines to equally distribute = total vaccines × factor
Number of vaccines to equally distribute, x = 3004 = 75
Remaining vaccines y = 300 − 75 = 225
Number of wins for agents is:
A1: 5 A2: 9 A3: 11 A4: 0 A5: 3
Step1: Allocation according to competition results
A1 will be allocated 5/30 * 225 = 37 vaccines
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Table 3.5: Agent Information at Round 3
Agents DD DI CN
A1 200 90 2
A2 400 100 2
A3 350 150 3
A4 120 60 0
A5 300 80 0
Table 3.6: Resource Allocation after Round 3
Agents Step 1 Step 2 Allocation
A1 37 39 76
A2 67 39 106
A3 0 39 39
A4 0 39 39
A5 0 39 39
A2 will be allocated 9/30 * 225 = 67 vaccines
Number of draws = 2 + A3 wins + A4 wins + A5 wins
Number of draws = 2 + 11 + 0 + 3 = 16
Step2: Number of vaccines to equally distribute = 75 + 1630 × 225 = 195
Resource allocation after round 3 is given in Table 3.6.
This process is terminated when one of the following condition is met
1. when all the agents are satisfied, in other words count of success in result vector is equal
to number of agents, which is our desired solution.
2. when count of success in the result vector is same as previous step and if same set of
agents returned success and the number of vaccines to be distributed equally is the same
as previous step, then its likely to oscillate, hence terminate. For example, in the above
problem considered, if the result of allocation is [success failure success success failure],
wins of A1, A3, A4 will be considered as draws and if the number of vaccines to distribute
equally is 205, then its likely to oscillate.
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If the negotiation phase terminates because of the second condition, then a brute force method
is accompanied. We execute a binary search between every pair of agents which returned
success and failure. The idea behind using pair-wise binary search is that few agents which
returned success might hold vaccines more than required to control the spread, hence such
extra vaccines can be used in other neighborhoods. As we have considered the environment to
be cooperative, these agents lend to agents which needs more vaccines to meet the objective.
If the outcome of this method is negative, then we output that there exists no solution i.e.
there is no resource allocation such that all the agents can be satisfied. Otherwise the outcome
of this method will be our final allocation. We evaluated our framework against brute force
method and results are presented in the next chapter.
3.2 Agent Simulation
To validate our framework, we have accompanied randomization based approach to simulate
agents which we shall detail in this section. We have considered the network to be a SIR
model. Initially the state of all entities is susceptible except for those given initial infected
nodes. When vaccines are allocated to agents, every agent tries to place the vaccines in its
neighborhood such that spread of infection controlled. To model the fact that not all vaccines
allocated are available at the moment, we assume that along with assignment of vaccines, value
of per-step-vaccine parameter is also given which essentially tells us the number of vaccines that
can be used at every time step out of total assigned vaccines. The value of per-step-vaccine
should be atleast 1. Once vaccinated, an entity cannot be infected again. Here we consider the
time to be discrete. Hence, at every time step, infection spreads to all the immediate neighbors
except for the nodes which are vaccinated from those nodes which are infected in previous time
step.
Each agent simulates using the Algorithm 1 which is continued until all the vaccines are
used or until all the nodes are either vaccinated or infected. If the agent succeeds in controlling
the information diffusion before number of infected nodes reaches the threshold value, then
agent keeps track of this vaccination strategy (which nodes are vaccinated and which nodes are
infected in particular simulation) and returns success. Otherwise i.e. if the threshold is reached,
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Agent Simulation
1: procedure Agent Simulation
2: count← 0
3: for i 1 to numberofvaccines do
4: for each node v in the neighborhood do
5: generate a random number between 1 and 10000
6: if random number > 5000 then
7: vaccinate node v
8: count + +
9: end if
10: if count == perStepVaccine then
11: count← 0
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end procedure
agent returns failure. Agents remembers the history particularly about the allocation to which it
returned success. Once vaccines are allocated, agents check whether current allocated vaccines
is equal or greater than the one seen previously, if yes then agents retrieves the vaccination
strategy from the history as current vaccination strategy and returns success.
In this way, a solution, such that every agent is satisfied with allocated vaccines is arrived,
if one exists or the framework outputs that there exists no satisfiable solution. A comparison
between proposed method and brute force method to distribute vaccines is presented in the
next chapter. In brute force method, available vaccines are distributed equally at initial step
and a pair-wise binary search is performed between satisfied and not satisfied agents until a
solution is found.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental setup
In our framework, each region is represented by a network of entities. For the purpose of
experimental evaluation, we have developed a simple simulation based technique and assumed
one infection/region to replicate how an agent will evaluate the effectiveness of allotted vac-
cines. We have conducted experiments widely on web-graph of Google where nodes represent
webpages and edges represent the hyperlink borrowed from Leskovec and Krevl (2014). Input
to our framework is the network, number of infections which typically is the number of agents,
size of the agents that decides how big agent’s neighborhood should be generated, number of
vaccines in total, number of vaccines per time step and number of simulations for agents to
run. Figure 4.1 outlines how we have generated multiple agents from given input network. We
consider that there is no intersection of nodes in the neighborhood of the agents. Size of N
agents is given as input. It is assumed that the objective is to control the infection spread
within the threshold where threshold is defined as one fourth of the size of the agents i.e. the
number of infected nodes should not reach the threshold given the number of time steps. To
evaluate the performance of our framework, we have conducted experiments using two different
methods and compared the time taken to find a resource allocation. The first method is the
Negotiation-based resource allocation and the second method is brute-force method. In brute-
force method, given vaccines are equally distributed among all the agents in the first round.
Then a pair wise binary search is accompanied between the agents satisfied and unsatisfied.
35
Figure 4.1: Generating agents
4.2 Evaluation
To evaluate our framework for resource allocation, we compare the results obtained from
proposed method with results obtained from brute force method. Table 4.1 depicts the size of
agent’s neighborhood for different experiments which need vaccines to control infection spread.
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 holds the information of experiments conducted which has the number
of agents, number of vaccines that is distributed among agents, solution (yes indicates that
there exists a satisfiable solution and no indicates there exists no satisfiable solution), number
of rounds in negotiation-based method (negotiation phase referred as neg and brute-force phase
referred as bin after neg) and brute-force method referred as bin, time taken to find a solution
(satisfiable or unsatisfiable) by negotiation-based method and brute-force method, and the
difference in time between both the methods(positive value indicates negotiation-based method
performed better and vice-versa).
4.2.1 Negotiation-based method will always find a satisfiable solution if one exists
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of different number vaccines among
same set of agents. In both the cases, the infection spread was successfully controlled. By
satisfiable solution we mean that, distribution of vaccines such that every agent is successful in
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Table 4.1: Size of Agents
EX-
PID
Size
exp1 377 37862 3 1 2848 12393 6418 2 16422 32544 356636 310972 410414 449878 591562
exp2 239 6409 28112 5 16036 2962 12 15596 30773 4 98031 501633 403062 2 1 3 1
exp3-
exp8
25562 1 1368 34874 998 7044 14431 26473 81371 235299 13279 508849 481899 1 583778 1 1 592945 4 1
600157 599967 1 600423 600447
exp9-
exp22
8453 11460 3 40457 2 8834 111418 34016 97065 46101 40711 1 1 571187 6 570292 598721 1 597036 600115
600276 600407 600217 600420 600478
exp23-
35
25562 1368 34874 998 7044 14431 26473 30687 102028 4127 428578 375936 538568 454523 4 587262 580846
596435 598918 599990 600156 600248 600413 600374 600445 600461
exp36-
42
10717 13478 2780 782 9770 28023 3 15 68000 23797 19507 438681 310993 550951 568398 591178 537787
574622 599114 599556 599320 1 600295 600240 600429 600476
exp43-
45
23165 2126 18795 1051 6125 18752 48145 27630 40592 259768 327327 501192 1 525179 588495 593931
592945 596360 599764 1 600262 1 599969 2 600422 600455 600469 600467 600481 1
exp46 15876 1 2266 32264 1 7612 20445 14 39677 52438 127581 22 356945 569244 1 574113 589211 22 2 2 1 600343
599821 600367 1 600453 600474 600459 600487 600483 600487 1 600493 1 600494
Table 4.2: Experimental Results
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exp1 15 1500 yes 8 4 28 204 643 7.3
exp2 17 700 yes 8 76 113 1748 2323 9.5
exp3 20 800 yes 10 46 73 1843 2093 4
exp4 25 500 no 8 52 80 970 1186 3.6
exp5 25 650 no 7 87 107 1461 1416 -0.78
exp6 25 900 no 8 108 130 2333 2340 0.12
exp7 25 850 yes 7 67 122 1597 1882 4.7
exp8 25 950 yes 5 53 106 834 2063 8.3
exp9 26 400 yes 5 97 106 1090 1202 1.86
exp10 26 450 yes 5 95 119 1199 1085 -1.9
exp11 26 500 no 7 98 116 1253 945 -5.12
exp12 26 575 no 4 101 122 1301 1336 0.5
exp13 26 600 no 6 107 110 870 1157 4.7
exp14 26 625 no 4 99 130 859 1396 8.9
exp15 26 650 no 7 112 140 1302 1517 3.5
exp16 26 675 no 4 103 143 1075 1573 8.3
exp17 26 700 no 5 110 125 1027 1409 6.4
exp18 26 725 no 4 105 126 960 1380 7
exp19 26 750 yes 7 101 126 981 1696 11.9
exp20 26 800 yes 5 119 113 2194 2879 11.4
exp21 26 850 no 6 117 150 1623 1792 2.8
exp22 26 900 yes 8 100 124 2640 2680 0.6
exp23 26 1025 no 8 84 111 1930 2006 1.2
exp24 26 1050 no 9 97 110 2578 2349 -3.8
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Table 4.3: Experimental Results
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exp25 26 1075 no 11 90 107 2015 2050 0.58
exp26 26 1100 no 11 82 112 2143 2616 7.8
exp27 26 1125 no 8 82 131 2535 3380 14
exp28 26 1150 no 10 79 118 2030 2574 9
exp29 26 1300 no 9 82 127 2467 3603 18.9
exp30 26 1600 no 9 98 130 2452 2779 5.4
exp31 26 2000 no 9 96 143 2272 3067 13.2
exp32 26 2500 no 10 110 146 2037 3377 22.3
exp33 26 2850 no 11 109 154 2812 3779 16.1
exp34 26 3100 no 11 117 152 2283 3630 22
exp35 26 3800 yes 12 36 63 618 730 1.8
exp36 26 375 no 8 57 103 1689 2269 9.6
exp37 26 425 no 8 61 105 1900 2624 12
exp38 26 475 no 10 95 115 2046 2901 14.2
exp39 26 725 yes 7 66 90 1975 2260 4.7
exp40 26 775 yes 8 83 99 1942 2174 3.8
exp41 26 900 yes 11 60 69 1615 1751 2.2
exp42 26 950 yes 6 65 81 1683 1838 2.5
exp43 30 1100 no 6 120 154 3944 4443 8.3
exp44 30 1200 no 6 132 173 3895 4513 10.2
exp45 30 1350 no 12 101 113 3802 3864 1
exp46 35 1100 yes 5 110 176 5673 6518 14
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Figure 4.2: exp8: Distribution Of Vaccines. All agents are satisfied.
controlling the infection spread is found and unsatisfiable solution is when there is atleast one
agent not successful in controlling infection spread with the allocation. The blue bar represents
the distribution of vaccines after the negotiation round. If a satisfiable solution is not found,
then brute-force method is used where agents holding extra vaccines than required to control
diffusion lends to agents which unsatisfied with assignment. The orange bar represents the
distribution of vaccines after negotiation round and brute-force(second round in negotiation-
based method) method. The gray bar indicates the distribution of vaccines from brute-force
method. Figure 4.4 depicts the distribution of vaccines on different set of agents where Infection
spread is controlled. We have observed that a solution such that every agent can control the
infection spread is found, if there exists one.
4.2.2 Negotiation-based method will always satisfy as many agents as the brute-
force method will satisfy
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of vaccines when there is
no satisfiable solution is found. In both Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, Negotiation based method
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Figure 4.3: exp7: Distribution Of Vaccines. All agents are satisfied.
Figure 4.4: exp19: Distribution Of Vaccines. All agents are satisfied.
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Figure 4.5: exp6: Distribution Of Vaccines. Agent 17 not satisfied and agents 10,17 not satisfied
in Negotiation-based and Brute-force methods respectively.
satisfies atleast as many agents as brute-force method. But in Figure 4.7, we observe that brute-
force method has larger number of agents satisfied. This observation is due to discrepancy in
the responses from agents between experiments.
4.2.3 Negotiation-based method will converge to a solution (satisfiable or unsat-
isfiable) faster than brute-force method
Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 depicts the difference of time taken by Negotiation-based
method and Brute-force method over three different set of agents. Let’s consider Figure 4.8,
where experiment was conducted with 26 agents with different number of vaccines. In this
experiment there exists a satisfiable solution with 750 vaccines. We observed that Negotiation-
based method converges to a solution faster. When the difference is positive, it means that
Negotiation-based method performed better than brute-force method and vice versa. There
are discrepancies due to difference in the responses from agents between experiments. We have
observed that Negotiation-based method will converge to a solution faster when the number
of vaccines is near to the optimal vaccines (optimal solution is the number of vaccines not too
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Figure 4.6: exp5: Distribution Of Vaccines. Agents 5,10,12 not satisfied and agents 9,10,12,17
not satisfied in Negotiation-based and Brute-force methods respectively.
Figure 4.7: exp28: Distribution Of Vaccines. Agents 8,10,11,16,17,18,21 not satisfied and
agents 10,17,18,20 not satisfied in Negotiation-based and Brute-force methods respectively.
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;
Figure 4.8: exp9-exp22: Time-difference between Negotiation-strategy and Brute-force strategy
Figure 4.9: exp23-exp35: Time-difference between Negotiation-strategy and Brute-force strat-
egy
less or not too more than required to satisfy all the participating agents).
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Figure 4.10: exp36-exp42: Time-difference between Negotiation-strategy and Brute-force strat-
egy
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
Controlling information diffusion is an important area of research in multiple domains rang-
ing from epidemiology, opinion propagation, firefighters to intrusion detection in networks. Due
to the nature of the real-world problems, there can be multiple regions with requirement of
resources to control information diffusion and resources available to prevent such diffusion are
often limited. Hence we cannot establish control mechanisms a prior and it is important to de-
vise a strategy that distributes the resources by observing the behavior of multiple networks. In
this thesis, we tried to address the question; Given the resources available and multiple agents
overseeing their respective neighborhoods, can a central controller distribute the resources by
sequence of interactions with agents, such that every agent can be satisfied. We adapted a
multi-agent negotiation based resource allocation framework with an objective to carefully al-
locate the available resources and control the information propagation in every neighborhood.
We proposed an iterative negotiation protocol controlled by a central controller to allocate and
reallocate the resources to multiple agents based on the partial information provided by the
agents. Our framework is modular; it can be evaluated with different control strategies by
agents depending on the requirements. Also we can control how much and what information
an agent is willing to provide to the mediator. We have applied our technique to publicly
available networks in SNAP project (Leskovec and Krevl (2014) to evaluate our framework and
the results prove that our methodology is feasible in real-time. We have given few experimental
observations which essentially tells us when the framework works best in comparison to brute
force method.
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5.2 Future Work
1. Negotiating the threshold
There are different aspects that can be negotiated besides negotiating vaccines among
agents. In the proposed framework, agents are cooperative and willing to lend excess
resources held by agents to those agents in need. Therefore, mediator negotiates with the
agents and reassigns the resources to agents. As a possible direction to future work, we
would like to investigate on the question; If the resources cannot be allocated in a way
that can satisfy the needs of all the agents, can agents negotiate over the threshold value
and reach to an approximation of satisfiability? If yes, how can we negotiate; keeping the
threshold constant, negotiate with resources, and if there exists no solution, negotiate
with the threshold and repeat the process. To explain the idea of negotiating threshold,
here is an instance; In field of epidemiology, let’s consider the two agents to be regions
A and B. In case of insufficient resources, region A might handle high threshold values
because of the large number of available medical facilities. Relatively, people in region A
have better access to medical facilities. With an objective to control the spread in every
region, the threshold value for agent representing A can be increased and assigned fewer
vaccines (resources).
2. Vaccines per time step
We consider that only a fraction of total vaccines are available at one time step. Every
agent, once allocated with vaccines, uses fraction of assigned vaccines at every time step
and simulates to check if information propagation can be controlled. We would like to
consider analyzing an open problem; Not imposing any restriction on number of vaccines
that can used by an agent per time step, instead leaving the choice of deciding on usage
of given vaccines on the agent, can we devise a better strategy to allocate resources?
3. Non-cooperating agents
In proposed method, we considered the agents to be cooperative but we would like to
explore the strategy when there are set of non-cooperative agents. Let’s assume there are
k groups of n agents where agents within a group cooperate with each other but agents
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do not cooperate with other agents in outside groups. The question would be on how
to distribute the resources based on the information given by different groups. There
will be negotiation based on information provided by agents but the truthfulness of the
information cannot be validated as set of agents are non-cooperative. Also we can consider
priorities among agents or group of agents where some agents might be responsible for
high-risk regions than others so that groups with higher priority will have to be protected
at any cost.
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